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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST

PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

11 OCT 1973

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
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda


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11 OCTOBER 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 41)

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ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT PLACES RESPONSIBILITY ON ISRAEL

Moscow media were quick to report the Damascus and Cairo announcements of "Israeli attacks" on 6 October against Syria and Egypt. But the restrained Soviet Government statement, broadcast by Moscow radio some 24 hours after the onset of the fighting, stopped short of explicitly claiming that Israel had initiated the current war. Leaving no doubt, however, that Moscow blames Tel Aviv for blocking a political settlement, the statement repeated the standard Soviet contention that the establishment of peace is impossible without Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since the 1967 war.

Brezhnev in his 8 October speech at a luncheon for Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka said that the USSR's sympathies are on the side of Egypt and Syria "who want to liberate their lands," and added cryptically that "we are prepared as before to make our contribution toward insuring peace." He prefaced these remarks with an allusion to detente which he said was interrupted in some areas by "new flare-ups of conflicts and tension." In keeping with Soviet practice of not disclosing private communications, Moscow has made no reference to the Nixon-Brezhnev exchange on the 7th announced by the White House. The Soviet Union has shown no interest in a new Security Council resolution, routinely calling for implementation of past UN resolutions, and it has not brought up the possibility of a cease-fire other than to mention the U.S. proposal at the Security Council for appropriate steps to end the fighting.

Moscow, as might be expected, has not broached the issue of military assistance to the Arabs. And while it has noted reports of Sixth Fleet movements and U.S. supplies of materiel to Israel, these have been given no particular prominence. Coverage of developments has included reports of Arab states' pledges of assistance to Egypt and Syria, but Moscow has not publicly encouraged the participation of other Arab states in the fighting.

TREATMENT OF FIGHTING	TASS and Moscow radio were prompt in reporting the onset of the fighting on 6 October, less than an hour after the initial announcements by Cairo and Damascus radios of "Israeli attacks" on Egyptian and Syrian positions. While Cairo's announcement preceded that of
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Damascus by about five minutes, TASS and Moscow's domestic and Arabic services first picked up the Syrian military statement and somewhat later reported the Cairo announcement.

Following the reports that fighting had erupted, Soviet media, including a PRAVDA review on the 7th, claimed that "after careful preparation and mobilization of reserves," Israel attacked Egypt and Syria, and PRAVDA bolstered the claim by saying that "the foreign press had reported this possibility several days running." Soviet media for their part on the 4th, 5th and early on the 6th had noted reports--many of them from Arab sources--of Israeli military concentrations and activity along the Golan Heights cease-fire line and tension along the Suez Canal. Read in a vacuum this might suggest that the USSR had prior knowledge of the Egyptian and Syrian plans to initiate coordinated attacks and were concerned to shift the blame to Israel. But it should be noted that it is not uncommon for Moscow to publicize Arab charges of Israeli military movements allegedly portending attacks on the Arabs.

Extensive reportage on developments since the 6th has been carried by Soviet media, which have primarily cited Cairo and Damascus military communiques and also presented roundups of world reaction. Scant attention has been given to statements from the Israeli side: TASS on the 7th did report Dayan as calling for wider military actions and on the 9th carried a London-dated dispatch claiming that Israeli leaders were making "instigating militarist" radio statements calling for "expansion of aggression" and annexation of Arab lands.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT, The government statement accused Tel
BREZHNEV REMARKS Aviv of having recently concentrated
 armed forces on the cease-fire lines
with Syria and Egypt, called up reservists, and then "unleashed
military operations." The statement stopped short, however,
of charging Israel with initiating the current fighting, and
other than referring to the Syrian and Egyptian cease-fire lines
it did not identify the Arab combatants. Brezhnev, in his
speech on the 8th, spoke even more cautiously of "the war
which has broken out again." The government statement
attributed to the Arab states "a lot of restraint and readiness
to seek a political settlement of the conflict," and repeated
the standard line that the establishment of peace in the
Middle East is impossible without "complete liberation of all"
Arab territories occupied by Israel and insurance of the

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"legitimate rights" of the Palestinians. It contained no hint of any Soviet action, concluding only that if the Israeli Government remained deaf to the voice of reason and continued to pursue its "annexationist" policy and ignore UN decisions, "this may cost the people of Israel dearly." According to TASS on the 10th, Matveyev argued in IZVESTIYA that defense of territorial inviolability and integrity is the inalienable right of every sovereign state; he insisted that the Arab states had demonstrated their readiness for a political settlement but had "never concealed their determination to make use of other means" if Israel did not agree to such a solution.

Brezhnev on the 8th described the Middle East conflict as a battle between Israel, "the aggressor," and Egypt and Syria, the victims of aggression which strive to liberate their lands, and placed Soviet sympathies with the victims. As for the USSR, he said, it supports a fair and stable peace and "guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of the area which is so close to our frontiers," and added that the Soviet Union was prepared to make its contribution toward insuring such a peace. Brezhnev's reference to peace and security is reminiscent of remarks he made on two occasions in July, when he called on the 10th for "restoration" of the frontiers of the states of the Middle East so that security of all countries and peoples of the region be reliably protected, and when he urged the following day that peace, security, and the state frontiers of all Middle East countries be guaranteed.*

Kosygin touched on the Middle East situation even more briefly in a speech at Prime Minister Tanaka's 9 October luncheon in which he declared that the "hotbed of war" in the region was the result of Israel's "aggressive hostile policy" toward the Arab states which again led to "aggravation of the conflict." The government statement, he said, denounced this "aggression" and reaffirmed support for the Arab struggle for a fair settlement.

SOVIET SUPPORT Moscow has been cautious in its public expressions of support for the Arab cause and has notably not repeated past pledges of assistance for the Arabs' "defense." Nor has Moscow given any hint of material assistance to the Arab combatants. Other than publicizing a scattering of the usual statements of support by Soviet public

* Brezhnev's remarks are discussed in the TRENDS of 18 July 1973, pages 12-14.

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organizations and international front groups, Moscow has yet to mount any major propaganda campaign. Thus only one meeting of "Soviet workers" to protest the "Israeli aggression" has been reported--in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 8th--and other broadcasts in Arabic have carried some statements by Soviet citizens expressing support for the Arabs.

The Soviet Government statement went no further than to assert that the Soviet Union was the Arabs' "reliable friend," and Brezhnev said that Soviet sympathies were on the side of the "victims of the aggression." According to a TASS report, the "significance" of Brezhnev's remarks was stressed by Gromyko in a meeting on the 11th with the ambassadors of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Jordan. TASS said that during the meeting, held at the Arabs' request, the ambassadors conveyed "heartfelt gratitude" for the Soviet Union's "invaluable all-round assistance and support" to the Arab countries fighting against "imperialist Israeli aggression" and upholding their freedom and national independence. At a 10 October Moscow meeting of the World Peace Council Presidium, according to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, a message from President as-Sadat was read by the Egyptian ambassador, and the ambassador expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union which "is giving us every means of support in our struggle in accordance with its principles." Accounts of the WPC meeting by TASS and Moscow's Arabic-language service brushed off as-Sadat's message in one sentence and said only that the Egyptian ambassador spoke.

Further Soviet-Arab consultations were disclosed by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY in a report on the 11th that Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Baqi had been sent by President al-Bakr to Moscow in accordance with the Soviet-Iraqi treaty's provisions for consultations on "important joint matters." INA said al-Baqi met with Podgorny on the 9th and conveyed Iraq's appreciation of the USSR's role in supporting the Arab struggle to liberate the occupied territory. Podgorny in turn said the Soviet Union supports the "Arab nation's just liberation struggle and stands firmly on its side." The foreign minister returned to Baghdad on the 10th with a message from Podgorny to the Iraqi president.

A Brezhnev letter on the 9th to Algeria's Boumediene and other Arab leaders--reported by Arab media but not acknowledged by Moscow--did assert, according to an Algiers radio account, that the USSR was giving "all-round aid and support" to the Arabs in their just struggle. The thrust of the message was to urge

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the other Arab states to assist Egypt and Syria, which "must not be alone in their struggle." Moscow has not openly encouraged the participation of other Arab states. TASS on the 9th reported "similar" decisions by Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan to place their armed forces at the disposal of the Egyptian-Syrian command, and cited an Iraqi Defense Ministry statement that Iraqi units were taking part in the fighting. An IZVESTIYA roundup of developments on the 10th noted reports of decisions by several Arab governments to give "various kinds of assistance" to the Egyptian and Syrian troops, including the dispatch of Algerian aircraft and Iraqi "military subunits" to Egypt and offers of "resources" by Southern Yemen, Tunisia, Sudan and other states. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the 9th criticized the BBC for "gross threats and incitement" in cautioning that the participation of Arab countries having no common border with Israel in the war on the side of Egypt and Syria was "fraught with the danger of interference of those who sympathize with Israel."

Soviet military assistance in the current situation was reported by the Beirut AL-ANWAR, according to a MENA dispatch on the 10th which attributed to "diplomatic sources" a report that the Soviet Union was presently supplying Egypt and Syria with new consignments of weapons and ammunition. The same sources were cited as saying there was constant consultation by Moscow with Cairo and Damascus to coordinate political stands and face military developments.

Soviet diplomatic activity in the Middle East has been noted in Arab media: In Egypt, for instance, President as-Sadat has received Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov at least three times since the fighting began on the 6th. According to Tripoli radio citing Cairo's AL-AHRAH, Vinogradov on the 6th delivered a message from Brezhnev to as-Sadat; MENA subsequently reported that Vinogradov was one of several ambassadors received by as-Sadat on the 7th, and they met again on the 9th.

UN DEBATES, U.S. ROLE TASS has given only routine attention to the discussions of the situation in the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Accounts on the 9th quoted Soviet delegate Malik as declaring in the council that the situation did not require any new UN resolutions but only implementation of previous UN decisions.

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TASS also noted U.S. delegate Scali's proposal for the return of the sides to positions held at the beginning of the current hostilities and Egyptian rejection of this idea.

Other than the report on Scali's statement, Moscow has made little mention of the United States in connection with the current fighting. The first reference to U.S. Sixth Fleet activity came in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 9th which reported Algerian concern over the attitude of "some Western powers" and the "suspicious movement" of the Sixth Fleet "to the battle zone." And TASS on the 10th reported the Department of Defense as announcing that a U.S. helicopter carrier was to join a task force 500 miles off the Israeli coast. TASS the same day cited Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat as speaking in the Security Council of reports that volunteer pilots were being recruited in the United States "to fight in the Middle East" and that the U.S. Government intended to supply Israel with 30 additional Phantom fighter-bombers. TASS on the 11th picked up a Virginia newspaper report that the United States "is secretly supplying Israel with arms and ammunition" and an Israeli plane had been loaded with bombs and missiles at a U.S. naval base.

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EAST EUROPEANS STRESS ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILITIES

Restrained official statements condemning in general terms "Israeli aggression" were issued by Moscow's orthodox East European allies and Yugoslavia. Romania's statement, by contrast, did not charge Israel with aggression and was unique in calling on "all nations" to bring about a halt to the hostilities. East Germany and Czechoslovakia issued their statements in the name of their parties and governments; Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia released government statements; Romania's contribution was an authorized AGERPRES statement. All the statements included a standard demand for Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in the 1967 war. Messages from Albanian president Lleshi to his Egyptian and Syrian counterparts on the 8th and 9th, respectively, scored the "barbarous" Israeli assault, allegedly instigated by "the U.S. imperialists"--not named in the other East European statements.

The moderate volume of followup East European comment included a Prague broadcast in English on the 8th which said it was "hypocritical" to ask who fired the first shot, since it was Israel which had obstructed a negotiated peace. And a talk carried by the East Berlin domestic service on the 9th denounced as a "transparent trick" Secretary Kissinger's call for "the USSR to show a sense of responsibility" in the present situation.

The official statements by the orthodox allies generally followed the line of the Soviet Government statement in attributing the start of military operations to Israel's constant provocations and military buildup on the cease-fire lines. The most direct charge of Israeli responsibility was in the Bulgarian Government statement, which referred to what it called "the resumption of Israel's aggressive military operations" against Egypt and Syria.

In contrast, Poland's statement, noting that "hostilities have been resumed," said only that the new fighting was "an obvious consequence" of Israel's occupation of Arab territory and alleged blocking of a settlement. Unlike the statements by Moscow and its other orthodox allies, the one from Warsaw was unique in failing to include an explicit pledge of support for the Arab side. Partially offsetting this omission, PAP on the 10th reported that a message from President Jablonski to Algerian President Boumediene, related to the Middle East fighting, included the assurance that Poland

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"will continue to act as an unfailing friend of the Arab nations." The report said the message was in response to one handed to Jablonski by the Algerian ambassador on the 9th. Another PAP report the same day carried messages of support for "the just struggle of the Arab nations" from the Polish Committee for Solidarity with the Nations of Asia and Africa to their Egyptian and Syrian opposite numbers.

Departing somewhat from Bucharest's neutrality of 1967 the 8 October AGERPRES statement said the latest events demonstrate that Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory constitutes a "permanent" source of tension and "a perpetual danger of resumed military confrontations." The statement underscored the need for an end to military hostilities and the restoration of peace in the Middle East and declared that "all nations have the highly responsible obligation to resolutely act" to stop the conflict. The main points of the statement were reiterated by Ceausescu in a Galati speech the next day. As reported by Bucharest radio, the Romanian president denounced "the escalation of military hostilities by Israel over the Syrian capital," as well as its "military hostility against the civilian population."

PEKING, OTHER ASIAN COMMUNISTS ASSAIL ISRAELI "AGGRESSION"

PEKING In 11 October messages to the Egyptian and Syrian presidents, Premier Chou En-lai voiced generalized support for the Arabs and condemnation of the "superpowers" for their "support and connivance" in Israel's "aggression." Chou promised to "unfailingly support" the Arab struggle, noting that it already enjoys "abundant support," and routinely expressed confidence that Arab perseverance and unity would overcome "any difficulties." The premier delivered the messages during separate meetings with the Egyptian and Syrian ambassadors on the 11th, according to NCNA.

Although Chou failed to mention either superpower by name, other Chinese comment has directly criticized Moscow's Middle East policy. Thus an 8 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, after a passing swipe at U.S. military aid to Tel Aviv, revived Chinese charges against Moscow on several major points. It asserted that Moscow was providing Israel with manpower by allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate there. The article also charged that Moscow was planning to restore diplomatic relations with Israel and had not allowed the Arab countries to use Soviet-supplied arms to regain lost territory.

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Also on the 8th, the Chinese foreign minister met with the Egyptian and Syrian ambassadors and the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Peking to express Chinese backing. The Chinese UN representative Huang Hua, speaking in the Security Council on the same day, hailed the Arabs for breaking the "no war, no peace" situation that the superpowers had allegedly been maintaining in the Mideast. Huang declared that any council resolution on the current conflict must condemn Israel, require it to withdraw from the occupied territories, and restore Palestinian national rights.

HANOI North Vietnam expressed support for the Arab cause in a government statement, a NHAN DAN editorial, and other commentaries in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The 9 October government statement accused Israel of attacking Egypt and Syria and asserted that the renewed fighting was a result of "the policy of aggression and expansion pursued by the Israeli authorities with U.S. assistance and encouragement." In an editorial on the 10th, NHAN DAN maintained that the United States was using Israel as its main instrument in implementing the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East but that this policy would fail, partly because the United States had been weakened by its defeat in Vietnam. The paper said the United States wanted to impose "neocolonialist rule" as a means of controlling the oil resources in this strategic region. A foreign ministry spokesman's statement broadcast by Hanoi on the 11th assailed Israel for the "criminal" 9 and 10 October bombing of Syrian and Egyptian cities and economic targets.

PYONGYANG North Korean solidarity was exhibited in a Kim Il-song message to the presidents of Egypt and Syria and a NODONG SINMUN article sympathetic to the Arab position. Kim's 7 October telegram asserted that Israel attacked the two Arab countries at the instigation of the United States and gave assurance that North Korea would support the Arab cause "both materially and morally." But the overall Korean reaction was not as vigorous as in 1967 when a Kim message of support to Arab leaders was supplemented by a government statement, major newspaper editorials, and mass rallies.

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USSR - JAPAN

MOSCOW YIELDS GROUND ON CONTROVERSIAL TERRITORIAL ISSUE

The joint statement marking the end of Prime Minister Tanaka's 7-10 October Moscow visit indicates that Moscow has abandoned its adamant stand against any discussion of Japanese claims to the four Soviet-held islands, the major stumbling block to a Soviet-Japanese treaty. Without specifically referring to the territorial issue, the statement linked the signing of a peace treaty, on which talks are to continue "at an appropriate time in 1974," with "settlement of outstanding questions, a leftover since the time of the second world war." Prior to his departure Tanaka publicly insisted that all four of the Soviet-held islands must be returned before a peace treaty is signed.*

Moscow's willingness to negotiate on the northern territories may be motivated by a strong desire to attract more Japanese capital and expertise, especially in Siberia. This is suggested by the focus on economic issues in the joint statement, particularly the reference to "unanimity" having been reached on further economic cooperation, including Siberian development. Japan has been hesitant to enter into any large-scale Siberian development schemes, in part because of Chinese opposition. The joint statement made no mention of China and the Asian collective security plan promoted by Moscow and treated the current Asian situation in generalities.

The speeches of the Soviet leaders during Tanaka's visit focused on Japan's economic might and the need for greater economic cooperation between the two countries, and indicated that a settlement of unresolved issues was possible. On 8 October Brezhnev stated that while complex problems can "hardly be solved at one stroke," gradually "all the obstacles . . . can well be surmounted." On the following day Kosygin emphasized the advantages of economic cooperation for both countries, noting that the summit meeting had proved "even though some issues remained unresolved."

* In a report on Tanaka's 11 October press conference, KYODO highlighted Tanaka's statement that he and Soviet leaders had agreed to negotiate on the conclusion of a peace treaty and other pending issues, "including the long-standing Japanese claim to a group of northern islands east of Hokkaido."

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The last comprehensive reiteration of Moscow's hard line on the territorial issue appeared in an Afonin commentary broadcast in Japanese on 11 September. Afonin was unusually frank in attacking Japanese hopes of linking settlement of the territorial question to the signing of a peace treaty with Moscow. He firmly argued that the two issues should be separated and lashed out at Chou En-lai for spelling out Peking's support for Japan's claim on the four northern islands in his report at the 10th CCP Congress. A 9 October commentary by Afonin, however, failed to mention the territorial problem in pointing to Tanaka's visit as setting the foundation for a "future advance" in USSR-Japan relations. Afonin simply noted that the signing of a peace treaty was being discussed at the summit talks as a means to push bilateral relations to "a higher stage in quality."

PEKING Peking has not yet reported the Moscow leg of Tanaka's 16 day tour of Europe and the USSR. Brief, factual reports on Tanaka's tour of France, Britain and West Germany were promptly issued. According to a KYODO report on 9 October, Chou En-lai told a visiting Japanese friendship group of his approval of the efforts being made by Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira "to achieve the aims of their visit to the Soviet Union." Peking has attempted to keep the northern territory issue alive as a wedge to enhance its leverage against Moscow and Tokyo.

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INDOCHINA

NOTES TO PARIS CONFEREES, PROTESTS DECRY U.S., GVN ACTIONS

North Vietnam and the PRG have issued a barrage of official statements protesting alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace accord. For only the second time since the February international conference "acknowledged" the agreement, the Vietnamese communists have addressed notes to the conferees. At the same time, increased fighting in the South triggered a flurry of PRG and DRV statements and comment denouncing a series of military actions by Saigon, allegedly taken with U.S. support. Saigon air strikes in Tay Ninh prompted foreign ministry statements, and there have been continuing statements by the ministry spokesman, and almost daily protests by the PRG delegation to the Joint Military Commission.

The current PRG and DRV foreign ministry notes to the Paris conferees, unlike the previous such communications which were dispatched last April, apparently were not sent to the United States or Saigon. Reports listed the addressees as the USSR, the PRC, Poland, Hungary, France, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, and Iran--replacing Canada as ICCS member--as well as to the UN Secretary General. Both the notes from the PRG, dated 1 October and released on the 4th, and the DRV, dated the 2d and released on the 5th, reflect a pessimistic view of developments in the South since the previous communications: The notes in April had adopted an evenhanded posture, purporting to inform the recipients of the "situation of the implementation of the agreement" in Vietnam. By contrast the current PRG note, for example, stated that it was informing them of "the present critical situation in South Vietnam caused by the United States' and Saigon Administration's continual serious violations of many main provisions of the Paris agreement."

The 1 October PRG note led off with a list of alleged U.S. violations of the peace accord and charged that by "words and deeds" Washington has demonstrated its intention of continuing to implement the Nixon Doctrine, "using the Saigon administration as an instrument to impose U.S. neocolonialism and to perpetuate the division of Vietnam." And it added that "this is the deep root and immediate cause of the current serious situation in South Vietnam." While the DRV note was less vitriolic regarding

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the United States, a supporting 6 October NHAN DAN editorial echoed the tone of the PRG when it declared: "The chief conspirator who has guided and controlled Thieu and provided him with the means to commit wrongdoings is the Nixon Administration, and the United States remains Vietnam's problem."

Among other things, the PRG note criticized the U.S. Defense Attache's Office in Saigon, claiming it is composed of "about 20,000 military personnel who, disguised as civilians, serve as advisors to the armed forces, the police and security forces, and help perform the 'pacification' program of the Saigon Administration." It also repeated charges that the United States has "illegally introduced into South Vietnam over 150,000 tons of armament, munitions and war material, including 200 tanks and armored vehicles and 500 military aircraft of various types." Both statements accused the United States of continuing air reconnaissance over North Vietnam and failing to carry out its obligations to aid the DRV; only the PRG repeated complaints that the United States has not fulfilled its obligations to clear mines from DRV waters.

The PRG note gave detailed accounts of Saigon's alleged efforts to undermine the cease-fire and then observed: "What is particularly serious, at present the Saigon army is using most barbarous methods in its frenzied sweeps and encroaching operations against the plains of central Trung Bo especially in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces." It also claimed that since June Saigon "has also intensified long-term operations with considerable forces . . . in Kontum and Gia Lai [Pleiku] provinces and . . . in Chuong Thien."

MINISTRY STATEMENTS ON TAY NINH BOMBING

The harshest communist protests on recent military action came in response to alleged 3 October Saigon

air strikes in Tay Ninh Province in which, according to LPA, A-37's "savagely bombed" a "heavily populated area." On 7 October, the PRG issued a foreign ministry statement condemning this action, and the DRV followed suit on the 8th. The PRG statement denounced U.S. shipment of war materials to South Vietnam and charged that U.S. generals had accompanied GVN President Thieu to Pleiku and "worked out plans for attacks on areas under the control of the PRG." And it went on to declare: "More serious still, on 3 October 1973, the Saigon command mustered many aircraft to carry out wanton bombings in areas controlled by the PRG" in

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Tay Ninh Province. The statement added that the PRG "vehemently denounces and severely condemns the above-said serious acts of violation of the Paris agreement" by Saigon and the United States.

Foreshadowing a tack to be taken in later press comment, the DRV Foreign Ministry statement claimed that the attacks took place against populated areas "lying deep" in the zone controlled by the PRG and termed them a "barbarous new crime" by Saigon. It further described the bombings as a "premeditated plan" by the United States and Saigon to sabotage the cease-fire.

The communists' apparent outrage over the Tay Ninh bombing was brought into sharp focus in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary published on the 11th. Contending that Saigon was "embarking on a new military adventures," the commentary declared that, "for the first time since the signing of the Paris agreement," Saigon has bombed and strafed "sectors deep in PRGRSV-controlled areas" in Tay Ninh. It charged that "using its air force to bomb and strafe the PRGRSV-controlled liberated areas is the most serious act of war thus far by the Saigon administration."

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EUROPE

PEKING HIGHLIGHTS PROGRESS TOWARD GREATER ATLANTIC UNITY

Out of concern for the maintenance of a strong Western counterweight to the Soviet Union, Peking has highlighted reports of progress by the United States and its European allies toward revitalization of their relations along the lines proposed by Dr. Kissinger last spring.* Highly selective NCNA news reports of the meeting of foreign ministers of the nine European Community (EC) countries in Copenhagen last month, for example, focused on the moves toward greater Atlantic unity and softpedaled the differences on trade, monetary and other matters that have emerged between the United States and its allies in Europe. Moreover, in keeping with Peking's continued stress on the strategic interdependence of the United States and its allies vis a vis the Soviet Union, NCNA went out of its way to report recent French statements in support of NATO and the U.S. presence in Europe.

NCNA's coverage of the Copenhagen meeting gave heavy play to the cooperative mood of the conferees toward the United States, as well as to their growing solidarity as an independent force in international affairs. To exemplify the "good results" achieved at the meeting, NCNA on 13 September reported West German Foreign Minister Scheel's statement that the conference had laid the basis for a "far-reaching, constructive dialogue with the United States." Another NCNA account on the 13th focusing on the growing unity in West Europe quoted from one of the conference reports that "it is necessary for Europe to occupy a place as an independent entity in world politics, especially in international negotiations." However, in contrast to Peking's past efforts to portray West European unity as a challenge to the United States, NCNA depicted this phenomenon as compatible with closer Atlantic unity, citing in particular Danish Foreign Minister Andersen's assessment that West European integration would improve the prospects for a successful dialogue with the United States.

NCNA discreetly ignored signs at the Copenhagen meeting of continuing serious West European differences with Washington, especially over economic matters, which had been reported in

* Peking's initial reaction to the Kissinger proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 May 1973, pages 11-13.

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the Western press. This discretion was evident, for example, in NCNA's report that only economic and political issues would be discussed by West European leaders when the President visits Europe and that military matters would be relegated to NATO. The report carefully avoided depicting this decision as a rebuff to U.S. efforts to have the three issues combined in a comprehensive agenda for the President's visit.

Peking has also endeavored to paper over fissures in the Western alliance in its recent treatment of France. While NCNA reports over the past year have featured remarks by various West European spokesmen advocating firm ties with Washington, they have generally softpedaled French affirmations of national independence. During the past few weeks, however, NCNA has broadened the scope of its coverage to include a good sampling of French comment, and by selective editing has managed to convey an image of keen French interest in solidarity with the United States. Most notably, even though Peking failed to elicit French endorsement of the Chinese position on Europe during President Pompidou's recent visit to China, NCNA's 28 September report of Pompidou's semi-annual press conference the day before managed to convey French approval of a strong Western alliance. The report ignored Pompidou's remarks in support of détente and relations with the Soviet Union and quoted him as stressing the importance of "the U.S. presence, the alliance with the United States, and the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe" for the future security of the continent. Similarly, a 27 September NCNA report on the French defense minister's meeting with Secretary Schlesinger last month excerpted the French minister's pledge of loyalty to NATO and support for the presence of U.S. troops in Europe.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON SALT TWO: In the first substantive public comment on SALT since the Washington Commit, Moscow has restated its long-standing contention that U.S. forward-based strategic systems (FBS), notably in Europe, should be included in any permanent agreement on limiting offensive weapons. The comment appeared in an article in the October issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS by G. Stakh, a frequent commentator on disarmament issues in NEW TIMES, the Soviet foreign affairs weekly. Stakh maintained that because of the asymmetries in force structures typified by FBS, the principle of "equal security"--incorporated as the basis of the SALT ONE agreements--does not mean acceptance of equal numbers of individual strategic systems. He also reiterated the standard Soviet criticism of U.S. efforts to create "trump cards" in the negotiations through accelerated technological development in areas not strictly covered by the SALT ONE agreements.

PRC-DRV AID ACCORD: Both Peking and Hanoi promptly reported the signing in Peking on 5 October of a "protocol" on China's "gratuitous" military aid to Vietnam in 1974. Unlike similar Sino-Vietnamese accords in recent years, there was no indication that the aid was "supplementary" to Chinese aid commitments under the terms of the annual Sino-Vietnamese economic-military assistance agreement, which this year was signed on 8 June. Consistent with Peking's more reserved posture toward Indochina in recent months, the ranking Chinese representatives at the signing ceremony were an aged military leader and a vice foreign minister, rather than a member of the Politburo. The previous two ceremonies on the signing of military aid agreements, on 28 June and 22 January 1972, had occasioned, respectively, appearances by two Chinese Politburo members, and a Politburo member along with the Chinese foreign minister.

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MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1 - 7 OCTOBER 1973

<u>Moscow (3175 items)</u>			<u>Peking (899 items)</u>		
Chilean Coup	(18%)	16%	Domestic Issues	(49%)	45%
China	(3%)	8%	[National Day	(1%)	23%]
[National Day	(--)	3%]	UNGA Session	(4%)	22%
GDR National Day	(--)	5%	[Chiao Kuan-hua	(--)	14%]
UNGA Session	(4%)	4%	Speech		
USSR Recognition of	(--)	4%	Vietnam	(3%)	5%
Guinea-Bissau			[PRC-DRV Military	(--)	2%]
PRAVDA on Brezhnev's	(--)	4%	Aid Agreement		
Collected Statements			Independence of	(1%)	5%
Middle East	(1%)	3%	Guinea-Bissau		
			Cambodia	(2%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.